In this chapter, the author William Lillie presents a detailed analysis of literature and exemplifications of intuition. Starting off with defining intuition as immediate understanding without needing the reason, he goes on to discern moral intuition as comprehension of something morally without any reasoning. Moral intuitions here are classified into three types. The first is perceptional intuitionism, or individual intuitionism, which is knowing directly that one specific action is right or wrong. This kind of intuition does not imply application in all possible cases. Dogmatic or general intuitionism is when you directly know that a certain category of actions is always right or wrong. The third category (universal intuitionism) is the direct knowledge of a moral principle as a compass to judge actions as right or wrong. The author explains these intuitions in detail, the objections to them, and the credibility of intuition as an ethical principle.
While discussing in detail the intuition about right or wrong, moral principles, and certain knowledge, the author takes into account the objections to its three types. Firstly, not every action or moral principle can be intuitively known as right or wrong. Secondly, intuition does not work in unusual cases where there is uncertainty about the right action. Lastly, mistakes have been reported while basing decisions on intuition, as the history evidences. The author highlights how intuition is not always trustworthy and may trigger bad decisions.
The study of whether intuition forms the basis of an ethical system raises several other objections. Intuitions, for example, can sometimes differ or contradict each other in different contexts among different people. Moreover, it is challenging to decide whether to heed a specific intuition regarding a single act or a general intuition about a group of actions.
The author argues that intuitionism fails as an ethical theory because our intuitions are almost always justifiable through reasons. Intuitionalism includes two forms that believe differently.
- a) All intuitions are unanalyzable.
- b) Intuitions may be analyzed and defended with reason.
To emphasize the point further, the author includes sections on The Moral Sense School and The Theory of Buttler.
The moral sense school was presented by Shaftesbury and enhanced by Hutcheson. It suggests that the moral sense can guide and motivate good conduct. It is also influenced by both natural affections for others and self-affections. It was further noted that this moral sense can be cultivated and improved. It results in actions benefiting both others and ourselves.
According to the moral sense view, this ability to discern right from wrong is comparable to the ability to distinguish between attractive and ugly things. There is a close resemblance between goodness and beauty, as they both involve making judgments.
The aesthetic judgment differs from one person’s taste to another but can be educated. The principles for skilling the judgments of aesthetic critics are studied in the normative science of aesthetics. Likely, moral judgment can be cultivated, and the principles are studied in the normative science of ethics. Furthermore, the moral compass can establish more objective ground than aesthetic standards, for it is not possible to contradict the former.
Bishop Butler’s Theory uses the term “conscience” instead of “moral sense” for intuitionism. This theory emphasizes that knowledge of right and wrong is a matter of reason and not of feeling.
Butler argues that various elements constitute human mind and are subordinate to one another. The mind’s impulses include hunger, fear, and pity, ultimately tempting us in our pursuit. These impulses were found to contradict psychological hedonism.
In Butler’s theory, rational and objective principles are set over these impulses. Furthermore, these principles were reported as natural tendencies of human nature. The principle of self-love and the principle of benevolence, for example.
The benevolence principle encompasses the tendency to seek the good of others. However, it varies in universality and rationality. In a nutshell, this theory highlights that happiness follows benevolence when it is successfully executed. Additionally, it also contributes in better well-being.
Individual intuitions:
It encompasses the idea that individuals should act on their intuition when they feel that a certain action is right for them at the moment. This is supported by the belief that practice in action can help individuals make intuitive decisions. The fact that unique moral situations may require immediate intuitive action also supports individual intuition.
This class of intuition acknowledges that intuition may not always be correct. Lack of prior experience or moral education is reported to be influencing it as well. However, rational reflection, consequences, and whether they conform to laws sometimes provide a better understanding of moral actions.
While presenting examples of how individual intuition applies and where it does not apply, the writer notes that it is important to reject contradictory intuitions. He highlights the importance of considering the validity of intuitive judgments compared to moral experience judgments. In summary, the author also points out that to rely on an individual intuitive conscience, ethics students must analyze its guiding principles and their validity as moral decisions.
General intuitions:
The concept of general intuitions in morality suggests that while many people believe in intuitive knowledge of right and wrong actions, these intuitions are not universal moral rules. They are mostly what a person is obliged to do in that situation. The writer goes on to mention that these intuitions are based on generalizations. These generalizations may come from experience with conduct leading to societal happiness.
The idea that morality is solely determined by intuition is criticized here because it ignores the context and the spirit of the action.
However, it is proposed that certain actions may be inherently opposed to natural laws. But we, as individuals, have unclear intuitions about these laws. Lying, for example, may be considered wrong in general. But there may be circumstances where it appears to be the best course of action.
Universal intuitions:
The section about universal intuitions discusses the philosophical theory for reaching universal truths. The writer differentiates this theory from ethical theory, explaining that the former focuses on principles or rules that can help determine whether an action is right or wrong.
The author also presents two theories of knowledge, inductive and deductive. He goes on to argue that empirical theories (or inductive approaches) are not suitable for ethics because ethics is a normative science, not a positive science. The deductive theory, on the other hand, suggests that our knowledge is based on abstract principles, which we know intuitively.
Overall, the author notes that intuition is not always accurate. He outlines that moral principles should be tested so that they are consistent and compatible with other intuitions and moral experiences.
